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Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free-riding by the
target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few shares as nec-
essary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such
low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful take-
overs. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward-sloping. Rules
promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and
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the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeover premia
induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen-
tration and are thus beneficial. Finally, one share–one vote and
simple majority are generally not optimal, and socially optimal
rules need not emerge through private contracting.
I. Introduction
The separation of ownership and control has long been recognized
as a crucial feature of modern corporations, and much research has
focused on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and man-
agers. Some authors point at managerial equity ownership as a way
to align the parties’ interests; managers with larger claims on the
firm’s cash flow are more prone to act in the interest of their (out-
side) shareholders ( Jensen and Meckling 1976). Others emphasize
that a well-functioning market for corporate control allows the re-
placement of management that does not maximize shareholders’
return (Manne 1965). Additionally, the mere threat of being re-
moved, it is argued, induces managers to act in the shareholders’
interest. Most of this literature examines the takeover mechanism
with regard to agency problems involving the incumbent manage-
ment. In particular, Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that ineffi-
cient management need not be vulnerable to a takeover bid. Because
of the shareholders’ free-rider behavior, the outsider does not make
a profit on shares acquired in a tender offer, and so too few takeovers
occur.1
In contrast, this paper analyzes the takeover mechanism with re-
gard to agency problems with the new controlling party. The central
proposition is that as a result of the shareholders’ free-rider behav-
ior, outsiders find it optimal to acquire as few shares as needed to
gain control. The resulting underconcentration of cash flow claims
maximizes posttakeover moral hazard and the associated ineffi-
ciency.
More specifically, the model assumes that, after the takeover, the
new controlling party, henceforth the bidder, can frustrate the mi-
nority shareholders of part of the (potential) improvement in share
value by allocating some corporate resources to the production of
private benefits. On the margin, the extraction of private benefits
yields less utility gains than it costs. As the bidder owns more shares,
he internalizes a larger part of this inefficiency, and moral hazard
1 Moreover, the takeover mechanism itself has been shown to give rise to consider-
able agency problems, e.g., managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny 1989).
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becomes less severe. Therefore, social surplus and the value of mi-
nority shares are increasing in the bidder’s final holding. These re-
sults do not hinge on the chosen framework with inefficient extrac-
tion of private benefits but are general and carry over to any standard
moral hazard model with costly effort.
At the tender offer stage, atomistic shareholders do not tender
unless the offered price matches the posttakeover share value
(Grossman and Hart 1980). This free-rider behavior has two conse-
quences. First, the equilibrium supply of shares is increasing in the
bid price. Shareholders are indifferent between tendering and re-
taining their shares at a low price only if they anticipate a low minor-
ity share value and hence a small fraction tendered. As the bid price
increases, the minority share value that leaves shareholders indiffer-
ent also increases, and so must the anticipated fraction of shares
tendered. Second, all the improvement in security benefits brought
about by the bidder goes to the shareholders. The bidder is not com-
pensated ex ante for abstaining from extracting private benefits ex
post. As a result, he aims at maximizing his private gains. Since the
opportunity cost of extraction increases with his final holding, the
bidder’s profits decrease with his final holding, provided that he has
gained control. The upward-sloping supply curve allows him to
make a bid low enough to attract as few shares as necessary, thereby
maximizing private gains.
Both positive and normative implications can be derived. First,
bidders favor gaining control by methods that do not necessitate the
acquisition of large stakes. For instance, they will concentrate on
acquiring equity with high rather than low voting power. Second,
corporate governance rules (e.g., one share–one vote) that lead to
the acquisition of larger stakes (of return rights) increase the take-
over premium, the value of minority shares, and social surplus in
takeovers. Similarly, a higher bid premium due to competition leads
to the tender of more shares and an increase in social surplus and
in the posttakeover share value. Third, a larger control majority and
a higher bid price induce, however, less extraction of private gains
and lower bidders’ profits, thereby preventing some desirable take-
overs.
Incumbent shareholders take these features into account when
designing corporate decision rules. They trade off higher takeover
premia and minority share value against a higher probability of take-
over. For instance, if there are only two classes of equity, voting and
nonvoting shares, it is shown that the one share–one vote rule need
not be optimal. Instead issuing nonvoting shares may be desirable
because it leads to a higher takeover probability or increases security
benefits in competitive takeovers.
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Finally, socially optimal rules need not emerge through private
contracting for two reasons. First, in contrast to incumbent share-
holders, a social planner will take into account the bidders’ private
benefits net of takeover costs when balancing takeover probability
versus takeover gains. Hence, the social cost of deterring bidders is
higher than the shareholders’ deterrence cost. Second, sharehold-
ers will favor rules (e.g., restricted offers) leading to high premia in
takeover contests even if they do not translate into more concen-
trated ownership. Shareholders will thereby emphasize the socially
neutral transfer of private benefits from bidders to themselves at the
expense of ex post efficiency.
The present paper is by no means the first to examine transfers
of control and their regulation in terms of their private and social
value. Grossman and Hart (1980) show that free-riding by target
shareholders can prevent efficient transfers of corporate control. To
overcome this problem, bidders should be allowed to dilute minority
shares. Grossman and Hart also find a discrepancy between socially
and privately optimal dilution levels. This paper extends their analy-
sis and argues that the free-rider behavior lowers social surplus and
the minority share value in takeovers that actually occur. Evaluating
the one share–one vote rule, Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that
the amount of shares that the controlling party needs to hold serves
as a screening device in control contests. By considering a moral
hazard rather than an adverse selection problem, the present paper
provides new results conflicting with their conclusions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the model.
Section III shows that the optimal bid leads to an underconcentra-
tion of ownership, thereby maximizing moral hazard ex post. Sec-
tion IV derives implications for several corporate governance rules
in the case of a single bidder. Section V extends the analysis to bid-
ding contests. Section VI discusses the case of value-decreasing bid-
ders. Section VII reviews the related literature. Section VIII presents
concluding remarks.
II. The Model
The model considers a widely held company facing a potential ac-
quirer (henceforth the bidder). If the bidder gains control, he can
generate a value improvement v . 0, relative to the share value un-
der the current management, which is normalized to zero. In addi-
tion, the bidder is also able to divert part of the value improvement
as private benefits. The company’s governance rules are such that
a successful takeover requires at least 50 percent of its voting rights,
and all shares carry the same number of votes. Tender offers are the
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only admissible mode of takeover. When confronted with an offer,
the incumbent management is assumed to remain passive. The se-
quence of events unfolds as follows.
In stage 1, the bidder makes a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional, un-
restricted tender offer:2 he submits a price b at which he has to buy
all shares tendered, subject to his holding a final stake greater than
or equal to 50 percent. The bidder may be endowed with an initial
stake ω ∈ [0, 1/2), which is common knowledge.3
In stage 2, the firm’s shareholders noncooperatively decide
whether to tender (part of ) their shares. Shareholders are assumed
to be homogeneous and atomistic. They do not perceive themselves
as pivotal for the outcome of the tender offer. Let α denote the total
fraction of shares tendered.
In stage 3, if α , 1/2 2 ω, the takeover fails. Otherwise the bidder
gains control and his final holding amounts to a fraction β 5 α 1
ω. In addition to the bid price, the successful bidder has to pay a
fixed cost c of administrating the takeover.4 He then decides how to
allocate corporate resources: they may be used either to generate
private benefits to the bidder or to improve all shareholders’ security
benefits. This decision is modeled by the bidder’s choice of φ ∈ [0,
1] such that security benefits are improved by (1 2 φ)v, whereas
private benefits d(φ)v are realized. It is assumed that the marginal
production of private benefits is less efficient than the marginal
improvement of security benefits. More precisely, the following
properties are assumed.
Assumption 1. The function d(φ) is twice continuously differenti-
able, strictly increasing, and concave on [0, 1], with d(0) 5 0, d ′(0)
5 1, and d ′(1) 5 0.
The function d(⋅) and the value improvement v are common
knowledge. Whether c is known only by the bidder or is common
knowledge is irrelevant at this point. Finally, the Pareto-dominance
criterion is used to select among multiple equilibrium outcomes.5
Two features of the extraction of private gains are crucial for the
2 Section B of the Appendix examines unconditional bids. Sections IVC and VD
analyze restricted offers without and with bidding contests, respectively.
3 Takeover regulations in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Euro-
pean Community Directive require bidders to disclose their initial stakes.
4 Whether the fixed cost accrues at stage 3 or 1 is irrelevant in the case of a single
bidder. The latter may be interpreted either as costs incurred when searching for
a target or as costs of preparing a bid.
5 Coordination among shareholders on the Pareto-dominating equilibrium is fur-
thered by control share acquisition laws. Adopted by more than 15 states in the
United States, they require that the acquirer gains approval by a majority of all out-
standing shares and by a majority of disinterested shares (Karpoff and Malatesta
1989).
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results: inefficiency and uniformity. The bidder’s private gains, mea-
sured in monetary terms, are, on the margin, less than the aggre-
gated loss in security benefits incurred to extract them. Extraction
of private benefits affects the value of all shares equally; that is, the
bidder cannot discriminate among shares when choosing φ.
There are various ways in which a controlling party can employ
corporate resources in a manner that primarily serves its own interest
rather than that of all shareholders. A prominent example is the
excessive retention of free cash flow. Furthermore, even if it is opti-
mal that cash be reinvested within the firm, management has been
known to follow non-value-maximizing investment policies such as
acquisitions motivated by empire-building ambitions or the diversi-
fication of corporate activities. Distortions of the capital allocation
among the firm’s divisions in order to subsidize the less efficient
ones can also serve the private interest of the controlling party. Fi-
nally, a more extreme example is the straight expropriation of mi-
nority shareholders by the controlling party through, for example,
transactions at preferential terms.
Numerous studies document self-serving actions by controlling
parties (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For instance, studies that ex-
amine the behavior of controlling parties threatened with the loss
of their private control benefits give clear evidence of such agency
problems. Moreover, the observed premium at which blocks trade
relative to the posttrade share value implies that control is valued;
that is, controlling parties receive benefits that do not accrue to
other investors. Probably some of the most compelling evidence of
self-serving behavior and its mitigation through equity ownership
stems from the literature on management buyouts. Jensen (1989)
argues that increased managerial ownership in leveraged buyouts
provides strong incentives for managers to abstain from wasteful in-
vestments and self-serving actions.6 Empirical studies (e.g., Kaplan
1989) document postbuyout operating improvement and value in-
creases and attribute them to improved incentives rather than to
wealth transfers.
This paper’s results are not specific to the chosen framework with
inefficient extraction of private benefits but would also obtain in a
standard moral hazard framework with costly effort. Suppose, for
example, that after the takeover the bidder chooses effort e at a cost
ψ(e) that increases security benefits by ev, where ψ(e) is increasing
6 According to Jensen, ‘‘More than any other factor, these organizations’ [lever-
aged buyout partnerships] resolution of the owner-manager conflict explains how
they can motivate the same people, managing the same resources, to perform so
much more effectively under private ownership than in publicly held corporate
form’’ (p. 65).
178 journal of political economy
and convex. Then inefficient misallocation translates into inefficient
shirking (e 5 1 2 φ). Because of the free-rider problem, the bidder
does not get compensated ex ante for the effort ex post and will thus
acquire as few shares as necessary so as to maximize his incentive
to shirk. However, in the absence of toeholds, the same free-rider
problem makes private benefits necessary for tender offers to be
profitable. The difference between the two formulations is that
within the extraction framework, private benefits are derived at a
public cost, whereas within the effort framework, public gains are
generated at a private cost. Using the former avoids having to assume
exogenous private benefits.
Finally, the assumption of inefficient extraction implies that firm
value is increasing in the bidder’s final stake. Hence, the model in
effect assumes that managerial share ownership has only a positive
alignment effect since it reduces agency problems. Potential nega-
tive entrenchment effects are ignored (see Mørck, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1988; Stulz 1988). Such effects, however, are less likely to
operate in this paper’s framework because a successful bidder owns
at least 50 percent of the voting rights and hence is fully entrenched.
III. Tender Offer and Ex Post Moral Hazard
This section shows that the tender offer mechanism only partially
resolves the moral hazard problem inherent in the separation of
ownership and control. More precisely, the shareholders’ free-rider
behavior results in the maximization of posttakeover moral hazard
and the associated inefficiency. Additionally, some implications are
derived for the supply of shares.
A. Optimal Bid
The tender offer game is analyzed by backward induction: the share
supply function and the resulting optimal bidding strategy are de-
rived in turn. Consider the bidder’s problem at stage 3. If β 5 ω 1
α , 50 percent, the takeover failed. If β $ 50 percent, the successful
bidder pays c and chooses the allocation φ, maximizing his profit
β(1 2 φ)v 1 d(φ)v 2 c .
Lemma 1. The extraction of private benefits chosen by the bidder
is strictly decreasing in his final holding.
The proof is given in section A of the Appendix. When choosing
φ, the bidder inefficiently reduces the value of both his and the mi-
nority shares. As β increases, the bidder internalizes more of the
inefficiency and extracts less private benefits. A direct consequence
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of the inverse relationship between φ and β is the positive relation-
ship between the value of the minority shares and the bidder’s final
stake. Note that for the bidder’s choice of φ, only his final holding
matters; his toehold and the takeover cost are irrelevant.
Finally, denote by φβ the allocation satisfying the bidder’s first-
order condition for a given β. For instance, if the bidder holds 50
percent, he will choose φ50%. By assumption, d ′(0) 5 1, which implies
φ100% 5 0. Hence, φβ ∈ [0, φ50%] for all β $ 50 percent.
Since shareholders are atomistic, each of them accepts the offer
at stage 2 if and only if b $ (1 2 φ)v . This inequality will be referred
to as the free-rider condition. In contrast to models in which φ is
exogenous, there does not exist a dominant strategy. Whether the
free-rider condition is satisfied for a given bid depends on the bid-
der’s final holding, about which each shareholder needs to form an
expectation, βˆ.
Lemma 2. For all bids b, there exists a single Pareto-dominant ra-
tional expectations continuation equilibrium outcome. More pre-
cisely, (i) for b , (1 2 φ50%)v, the bid fails; (ii) for b ∈ [(1 2 φ50%)v,
v], the bid succeeds and a fraction α ∈ [1/2 2 ω, 1 2 ω] is tendered
such that b 5 (1 2 φω1α)v ; and (iii) for b . v, the bid succeeds and
all 1 2 ω shares are tendered.
The proof is given in section B of the Appendix. The rational
expectations equilibrium with b ∈ [(1 2 φ50%)v, v] requires that β 5
βˆ and that shareholders are ex ante indifferent between tendering
and retaining their shares. The latter condition implies that the bid
has to be equal to the expected minority share value. Suppose to
the contrary that either b . (1 2 φβˆ)v or b , (1 2 φβˆ)v . In the former
case, nontendering shareholders would be better off accepting the
offer; in the latter case, tendering shareholders would be better off
retaining their shares.
Note that since shareholders are indifferent between tendering
and retaining their shares, an increase in the bid price also benefits
nontendering shareholders. Moreover, as the deadweight loss associ-
ated with the extraction of private benefits is increasing in φ by as-
sumption, the inverse relationship between b and φ also implies that
the social surplus increases with the bid price.
It is worth pointing out that only the equilibrium outcome of stage
2 has been determined, not an equilibrium of the shareholders’
strategies. For instance, the equilibrium outcome obtains when
shareholders behave symmetrically, each tendering his shares with
probability α and retaining them with probability 1 2 α. Provided
that the law of large numbers holds, exactly a fraction α of all shares
is tendered in equilibrium (see sec. B of the Appendix for details).
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At stage 1, the bidder chooses a bid price b to maximize his profit
Π(b) 5 (ω 1 α)(1 2 φ)v 1 d(φ)v 2 αb 2 c
subject to gaining control, that is, β $ 50 percent.
Lemma 3. The takeover has a unique equilibrium outcome: (i) for
c # [ω(1 2 φ50%) 1 d(φ50%)]v, the bidder offers b 5 (1 2 φ50%)v,
and his final stake is β 5 50 percent; and (ii) for c . [ω(1 2 φ50%)
1 d(φ50%)]v, the takeover does not take place.
The proof is given in section C of the Appendix. Since the bidder
has to pay exactly the minority share value, he cannot make any
profit on the tendered shares.7 Hence, in the absence of a toehold
(ω 5 0), his private gains constitute his only profit. Ex ante, the
bidder would like to commit to distorting the resource allocation as
much as possible. However, given that the extraction of private bene-
fits involves a deadweight loss, this threat is not credible. If his final
fraction is larger, he will distort the resource allocation to a lesser
extent. By offering a low price, the bidder ensures that he does not
acquire too many shares and thereby maintains high incentives to
extract private benefits ex post.
Note that the bid price and the bidder’s final holding are indepen-
dent of his toehold. Indeed, because of the free-rider problem, his
only gains are his private benefits d(φ)v and the value improvement
of his initial stake ω(1 2 φ)v . As a result, his marginal return from
increasing his holding by offering a higher price and reducing ex-
traction is [2ω 1 d ′(φ)]v . Since ω , 50 percent # β and in equilib-
rium β 5 d ′(φ), the same corner solution obtains for all ω.8
The conclusions of the analysis above are summarized in proposi-
tion 1. They will be central to the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 1. The bidder’s final holding is increasing in his bid.
An increase in the bid price/final holding (i) increases social sur-
plus, (ii) increases tendering and nontendering shareholders’ re-
turn, and (iii) reduces the bidder’s surplus. Hence, the bidder’s opti-
mal bid is low enough to gain control with as few shares as necessary.
As a result, social surplus and security benefits are minimized.
Notice that two ingredients are necessary for the optimality of
7 Note that the bidder bears the costs of extracting private benefits on his toehold
but not on the shares he acquires. That is, although ex post the bidder bears these
costs, they are already reflected in the bid price and are thus passed on to the ten-
dering shareholders.
8 This clear-cut result relies on the assumption that d ′(0) 5 1. If instead d ′(0) ,
1 were assumed, the loss on the initial stake might exceed the private gains. In this
case, the bidder would not extract any private benefits and would offer a price equal
to v . A sufficient condition for no extraction is ω . d ′(0). The fraction tendered,
however, would be indeterminate in the range [1/2, 1] since the value of the minority
share does not depend on the bidder’s final holding.
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holding only 50 percent: a public good problem and a commitment
problem. First, a shareholder’s decision to tender creates an exter-
nality for other shareholders. Indeed, when the bidder acquires
more shares, the value of the remaining minority shares is higher.
However, because of the free-rider problem, shareholders cannot
compensate the bidder ex ante (by means of a large supply for a
low price) for refraining from extracting private benefits ex post.
Second, the bidder faces a time consistency problem. For instance,
he cannot commit to distorting the allocation maximally should he
receive less than 100 percent of the shares.
The bidder finds himself in a situation akin to that facing an entre-
preneur in need of outside finance. Neither of them can commit ex
ante to a specific behavior ex post. When the entrepreneur sells part
of the return rights to outside investors, his incentives to exert effort
fall. Anticipating this adverse incentive effect, outside investors pay
less per share when the entrepreneur retains a smaller stake. The
entrepreneur bears the full costs of going public ( Jensen and Meck-
ling 1976). In the present paper, the problem is reversed. The dis-
persed sellers anticipate that the (minority) share value will depend
on the size of the bidder’s final holding. Hence, all the gains from
concentration go to them. The bidder responds by aiming at the
minimum level of ownership concentration necessary, thereby main-
taining his incentives to extract private gains.
The optimality of bidding for only 50 percent is also due to the
bidder’s perfect knowledge of the supply curve. When the bidder is
uncertain about the actual supply curve, he may sometimes hold
more than 50 percent and tender offers may sometimes fail. With
sufficient noise, a bidder will not aim to ensure success with probabil-
ity one. Increasing the probability of success by bidding higher in-
creases the expected fraction of tendered shares but lowers expected
private gains.9
B. Upward-Sloping Supply Curve
The previous analysis derived an equilibrium for a continuum of bid
prices, where shareholders are indifferent between tendering and
retaining their shares. This further feature is of interest in itself.
Proposition 2. The supply of shares is strictly increasing in the
bid price.
As the minority share value is increasing in the bidder’s final hold-
9 In some countries (e.g., Sweden), tax savings through the transfer of losses and
gains among companies are allowed only for fully owned subsidiaries, providing an
incentive to acquire 100 percent (Bergstro¨m, Ho¨gfeldt, and Ho¨gholm 1994).
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ing (lemma 1), the equilibrium condition b 5 (1 2 φβ)v implies that
the fraction tendered increases in the bid price. That is, the bidder’s
scope for reducing the minority share value after having gained con-
trol generates an upward-sloping supply curve. This result relies
solely on the increasing inefficiency associated with the extraction
of private gains or on any other posttakeover moral hazard problem.
Empirical evidence seems to indicate that the number of shares
supplied in a tender offer indeed increases with the bid premium
(Hirshleifer 1995). The present model captures this feature even
though shareholders are, by assumption, homogeneous and free-
ride. In contrast, many takeover models that incorporate these two
assumptions fail to generate an upward-sloping supply curve. More-
over, previous models reproducing such a curve seem to be geared
to this very purpose. They rely either on uncertainty or on exoge-
nous differences among shareholders. More precisely, an upward-
sloping supply curve can also obtain if the shareholders’ (common)
opportunity costs of tendering are unknown to the bidder (Stulz
1988; Hirshleifer and Titman 1990); if they vary across shareholders
because of, for example, liquidity needs, tax rates, or differing views
about the value of the target firm (Bebchuk 1985a); or if each share-
holder’s marginal opportunity cost of tendering increases as he ten-
ders more shares. In this paper, the opportunity cost of tendering
is endogenous and increases with the total number of shares ten-
dered. Yet, it is known to the bidder, uniform across shareholders,
and for each shareholder constant in the number of shares that he
tenders.
Note, moreover, that uncertainty per se (i.e., without heteroge-
neous shareholders) can generate only an upward-sloping expected
supply curve. A higher bid price is more likely to exceed the share-
holders’ opportunity cost of tendering, inducing all shareholders to
tender. However, ex post, all shareholders either tender or retain
the shares. In contrast, in this paper, the actual supply curve is
upward-sloping. Introducing opportunity costs unknown to the bid-
der would lead to uncertainty about the actual position of the supply
curve, without affecting its shape.
IV. Corporate Decision Rules: The Single-Bidder
Case
The previous section has shown that the maximization of social and
shareholders’ surplus requires that the bidder acquires as large a
stake as possible. However, because of the free-rider problem, the
bidder has the incentive to acquire as small a stake as possible. This
conflict calls for rules designed by the social planner (e.g., through
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state legislation) or by the initial shareholders (in the corporate
charter) to reduce these shortcomings of the tender offer mecha-
nism. This section examines the impact of some commonly observed
rules. Section V provides an analysis of competition among bidders.
The model is extended as follows.
In stage 0, the social planner or the initial shareholders choose
corporate decision rules. This choice is made under uncertainty
about the characteristics (c, ω, v, d(⋅)) of the bidder appearing at
stage 1. The probability distribution of these characteristics is
known. The dispersed ownership structure is taken as given. The
social planner maximizes expected social surplus E[[(1 2 φ) 1
d(φ)]v 2 c], whereas shareholders are assumed to maximize ex-
pected security benefits E[(1 2 φ)v].
A. Supermajority Rule and Security-Voting Structure
The firm’s security-voting structure and majority rule influence the
amount of return rights that the new controlling party needs to hold.
For simplicity, the analysis is restricted to two classes of shares: voting
shares with a fraction s of return rights and nonvoting shares with
a fraction 1 2 s of return rights.10 Denote κ ∈ [1/2, 1] the control
majority, that is, the fraction of votes required to gain control. For
instance, κ 5 50 percent corresponds to the simple majority rule.
Lemma 4. The probability of a takeover is (weakly) decreasing in
κs . Given that a takeover occurs, neither the expected premium nor
the expected net social surplus need be monotonically increasing
in κs .
The proof is given in section D of the Appendix. Acquiring non-
voting shares is of no use in gaining control. Furthermore, it reduces
the bidder’s private gains by increasing his final holding. Hence, he
will bid only for voting shares so as to hold the required control
majority, that is, a fraction κs of return rights. Increasing κs forces
the bidder to hold a larger fraction of return rights. This implies
lower gains available to the bidder to cover the takeover cost. Conse-
quently, fewer potential bidders will find it profitable to undertake
a tender offer. Note that, for a given potential bidder, the mitigation
of the moral hazard problem through an increase in the control
majority results in a higher minority share value and thus a higher
takeover premium. This statement, however, does not generally hold
10 In the comparative static exercises that follow, it is assumed that ω , κs, where
ω is the fraction of return rights initially held by the bidder. Otherwise, the bidder’s
final holding is ω (instead of κs) either because he already has control or because
he acquires control by selling nonvoting shares and buying voting shares.
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true in expected terms. Indeed, the conditional expected takeover
premium may be decreasing in κs . For instance, an increase in κs
may deter those bidders who are highly inefficient at extracting pri-
vate gains and were offering the highest premia.11
Lemma 4 has implications for the optimal security-voting struc-
ture that contrast with the results in the literature regarding the opti-
mality of the one share–one vote rule.
Proposition 3. For a given majority rule, the one share–one vote
rule may prevent too many takeovers. Hence, it need maximize nei-
ther social surplus nor security benefits.
Consider an increase in the fraction of voting shares for a given
majority rule. On the one hand, it reduces unambiguously the likeli-
hood of a takeover. On the other hand, it may or may not have bene-
ficial effects on the conditional expectation of the net social surplus
and the shareholder return. Under the one share–one vote rule, the
takeover probability is minimized, whereas neither the conditional
expected net social surplus nor the conditional expected takeover
premium is necessarily maximized. Consequently, there is no reason
why the one share–one vote rule should be the solution to the social
planner’s or the shareholders’ optimization problem. For instance,
issuing some nonvoting shares is likely to be optimal when takeover
costs are substantial. In contrast, when bidders face no costs, there
is no potential for preventing takeovers, and one share–one vote is
both socially and privately optimal for any majority rule. In general,
however, no single rule will optimally resolve in all circumstances
the trade-off between fewer takeovers and more efficient takeovers
(respectively, higher takeover premia).
Since the effects described above are due to changes in the prod-
uct κs, the majority rule and the security-voting structure are substi-
tutes. The same value of κs is obtained for different pairs (κ, s). It
is thus equally true that, given a security-voting structure, neither
the social surplus nor the security benefits need be maximized under
any given majority rule, such as the simple majority. While proposi-
tion 3 does not identify an optimal security-voting structure, it pro-
vides a rationale for nonvoting shares (or shares with low voting
power). Nonvoting shares increase bidders’ gains and hence pro-
mote the occurrence of takeovers. This consideration, however, ab-
stracts from the consequences that nonvoting shares have on the
ease with which a party can entrench itself.
11 The independent and identical distribution of the bidders’ characteristics is not
sufficient to ensure that the conditional expected takeover premium is increasing
in κs . This statement holds true, however, if the uncertainty pertains exclusively to
the takeover cost c .
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For both the social planner and the shareholders, the optimal rule
trades off the improvement brought about by a bidder against the
likelihood of a tender offer. Yet, socially optimal decision rules need
not emerge from private contracting.
Proposition 4. The target shareholders’ optimal decision rule
requires the bidder to hold more return rights than the socially opti-
mal rule, and the resulting takeover probability is less than socially
optimal.
The proof is given in section E of the Appendix. As κs, the number
of return rights required to gain control, increases, the likelihood
of a takeover decreases. For the shareholders, the marginal cost of
deterring bidders is smaller than the social cost since they do not
take into account the bidder’s private benefits net of the takeover
cost. As a result, shareholders will pick a rule that deters more bid-
ders than is socially optimal.12 In particular, for a given majority rule,
target shareholders will tend to choose a security-voting structure
that is closer to one share–one vote than is socially optimal, thereby
preventing some efficient takeovers. Conversely, for a given security-
voting structure, they will set a higher majority rule than is socially
optimal.
Although this section’s results were developed within a dual-class
share system, they can be extended to more sophisticated security-
voting structures. Consider several classes of shares carrying differ-
ent voting power. The bidder will acquire the required control ma-
jority by acquiring the least number of return rights possible. That
is, he bids first for the shares with the highest voting power, then
for those with the second-highest voting power, and so on until he
reaches the control majority. Hence, this section’s results extend nat-
urally since the fraction of return rights that any such multiclass
share structure forces the bidder to hold can be replicated within a
dual-class system by choosing κ and s appropriately.
B. Freeze-out
A compulsory acquisition limit (CAL) entitles a bidder who holds
more shares than a threshold f after a tender offer13 to freeze out
the remaining minority shareholders, that is, to force them to sell
on the terms of the offer. The common motivation is to prevent a
small group of shareholders from frustrating the complete success
12 A value of c . 0 implies that the socially optimal level of return right κs required
to gain control is not the corner solution that minimizes the bidder’s surplus in a
takeover. Hence, it also implies that the inequality in proposition 4 is strict.
13 In most European corporate legal systems the CAL is 90 percent (Bergstro¨m
et al. 1994).
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of an offer. The present analysis provides another rationale for this
rule.
Proposition 5. For any given decision rule (κ, s), introducing any
freeze-out rule (1 . f . κs) leads to an increase in takeover premia
and constitutes a Pareto improvement.
The proof is given in section F of the Appendix. A freeze-out rule
rewards a bidder for acquiring a fraction f . κs at a higher price
(1 2 φ f )v by leaving him φ fv, the difference between the bid price
and the maximal improvement in share value. When this option is
introduced, some bidders who would not have made a tender offer
and some who would have bid for the control majority switch to this
new option. Hence, more tender offers take place, at a higher price,
leading to more concentrated ownership. The first and second ef-
fects increase security benefits whereas the first and third increase
social surplus. The welfare impact of a freeze-out rule is thus unam-
biguously positive, relative to a regime with no such rule (i.e., f 5
1). Moreover, depriving remaining minority shareholders of the op-
tion to retain their shares can be beneficial for all target sharehold-
ers. In particular, by mitigating the free-rider problem, such a rule
induces higher bid prices.
Similarly to the security-voting structures, the socially optimal
freeze-out threshold need not coincide with the level preferred by
the target shareholders. Shareholders are interested in high bids per
se and ignore the bidder’s private benefits and costs. Indeed, con-
sider the effects of a decrease in f. The bidder’s profit in the freeze-
out option is increased since he has to bid a lower price to reach
the CAL. Again, some bidders who would not have made a tender
offer and some who would have bid for the control majority switch
to this option. Those who have already chosen the freeze-out option
stick to it. This third effect is neutral in terms of social surplus since
the same final ownership concentration obtains (β 5 1). As a result,
social surplus is decreasing in f. A lower CAL will induce more take-
overs without costly extraction of private benefits.14 However, the
third effect is detrimental to shareholders: to reach a smaller thresh-
old, the bidder reduces his bid price. Hence, security benefits need
not be monotonic in f. The CAL maximizing security benefits trades
off the likelihood of tender offers against the bid premium. It should
be noted that this analysis abstracts from many issues that, in prac-
14 In this model, the socially optimal rule is to have κs as small as possible and to
set f 5 κs . Under such a rule, the bidder extracts (almost) the whole social surplus.
He thus has an incentive to maximize it, i.e., to abstain from extracting private gains.
Obviously, this rule is subject to many flaws. In particular, it is extremely vulnerable
to value-decreasing bidders who would benefit from the low κs but not exercise the
freeze-out option.
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tice, might make freeze-outs harmful for target shareholders (Beb-
chuk 1985b).
C. Mandatory Bid Rule
Within the takeover regulation, the mandatory bid rule (MBR) is
highly controversial. Its two basic elements are the right to sell provi-
sion, which amounts to a prohibition of partial bids, and the equal
bid provision, which requires bidders to offer all shareholders the
same tender price.15 Since shareholders are assumed to be atomistic
and homogeneous, the present framework is not suited to analyzing
the latter provision. The subsequent discussion of the MBR is con-
cerned only with the prohibition of partial bids. For simplicity, one
share–one vote and simple majority are assumed.
Proposition 6. The mandatory bid rule is irrelevant.
Proof. The bidder’s optimal unrestricted bid attracts 50 percent of
the shares (proposition 1). Hence, the MBR does not affect the out-
come.16 Q.E.D.
It is interesting to note that the MBR leads neither to the acquisi-
tion of more shares by the bidder nor to a higher premium. The
shortcoming of the MBR is its lack of coercion. It does not require
the bidder to buy all shares, but merely those shares tendered. This
obligation is vacuous since it remains still at the bidder’s discretion
how many shares will actually be tendered. In contrast, a supermajor-
ity rule effectively forces the bidder to offer a higher bid price in
order to acquire the required larger number of shares.
The irrelevance of the MBR breaks down once restricted offers
can be combined with a freeze-out in so-called front-end-loaded or
two-tier bids. In a two-tier offer, the bidder makes a bid restricted
to a fraction ρ of shares at an initial price b0, where ρ is sufficient
to transfer control to the bidder (i.e., ρ $ 50 percent). If the bid is
successful, the bidder has the option to buy out all remaining share-
holders at an end price b1 possibly lower than the initial price b0. In
the present framework, it is easily seen that the bidder would choose
ρ 5 50 percent and b1 # b0. If b0 5 b1, the two-tier offer is equivalent
to a freeze-out rule with threshold f 5 ρ, already analyzed in the
previous subsection. Consider instead the case in which b0 . b1 and
15 The U.K. city code and the E.C. directive on takeovers include the mandatory
bid rule. While discriminatory offers are generally forbidden in the United States,
partial bids are legal, except in Pennsylvania and Maine (Karpoff and Malatesta
1989).
16 Note that under a restricted offer, the equilibrium outcome obtains with domi-
nant strategies. In particular, there is no need to invoke the Pareto-dominance crite-
rion.
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b0 $ 0. Assume, moreover, that the bidder has, ex post, an incentive
to buy out the remaining shareholders (i.e., [1/2(1 2 φρ) 1 d(φρ)]v
# v 2 1/2b1). It is a dominant strategy for all shareholders, anticipat-
ing that the bidder exercises this option, to tender in the initial offer.
Several implications can be derived from this informal analysis. First,
the option to make a two-tier bid that is restricted to a fraction of
the shares is not innocuous. Contrary to the simple freeze-out rule,
target shareholders are rationed in equilibrium. Second, a two-tier
bid and an unrestricted offer followed by a freeze-out (with thresh-
old f 5 50 percent) are both means for the bidder to acquire 100
percent of the shares, but the former is cheaper. Hence, under the
restrictions of the present framework, allowing two-tier bids is so-
cially optimal since it leads to more takeovers and a more concen-
trated ownership structure. Finally, contrary to a simple freeze-out
rule, allowing two-tier bids in which the front price can be higher
than the end price need not benefit target shareholders. Actually,
many states in the United States have introduced fair-price laws for-
bidding such bids (Karpoff and Malatesta 1989).
V. Corporate Decision Rules: The Competition
Case
This section analyzes bidding contests and their implications for cor-
porate decision rules.
A. Competition
Consider two bidders, bidders 1 and 2, competing in a second-price,
sealed-bid auction with unrestricted conditional bids. Assume one
share–one vote and simple majority. Bidder i can extract private ben-
efits according to the function d i(⋅) and has a valuation vi . 0 with
v 1 , v 2. For the sake of analytical simplicity, neither bidder owns
an initial stake (i.e., ω1 5 ω2 5 0) and takeover costs are set equal
to zero (i.e., c 1 5 c 2 5 0).17
Lemma 5. Bidder 2 wins the contest with a bid price b 5 max[v 1;
(1 2 φ50%2 )v 2].
Bidder i is willing to bid up to vi. For all bi , vi, the fraction ten-
dered would be less than one (lemma 2), leaving him with some
private gains. Since v 1 , v 2 by assumption, bidder 2 will win the
contest. In addition to attracting 50 percent of the shares, bidder 2
17 With two bidders, the English and second-price, sealed-bid auctions with private
values are strategically equivalent (Burkart 1995). Abstracting from initial stakes and
takeover costs is not innocuous and is likely to affect the results in this section. Initial
stakes lead to overbidding in takeover contests (Burkart 1995), whereas the impact
of takeover costs in bidding contests varies across models.
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has to outbid his rival. When the latter constraint is binding, that is,
v 1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, competition results in a higher bid price. Hence,
effective competition benefits target shareholders and is detrimental
to the winning bidder. This seems hardly surprising and has been
confirmed empirically (Stulz, Walkling, and Song 1990). More inter-
esting and specific to the present model are the benefits of competi-
tion in terms of social surplus.
Proposition 7. Compared to the single-bidder case, competition
(even by a weaker rival) leads to the acquisition of more shares by
the winning bidder and increases social surplus.
The proof is given in section G of the Appendix. The higher bid
price b 5 v 1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2 leads to an increase in the supply of
shares tendered and hence a larger social surplus. In most takeover
models, the introduction of a rival bidder is generally beneficial to
the target shareholders. However, competition is socially desirable
only insofar as the new contender runs the firm more efficiently than
its competitor. In the present paper’s framework, introducing a new
contender can increase social surplus even if the actual acquirer re-
mains unchanged. This suggests that takeover regulations might put
some weight on competition per se, that is, not only with regard to
improving the pool of potential bidders.
A similar effect arises in the case in which a monopolist competes
in prices against a rival with higher marginal cost. The pressure of
the potential competition leads to a lower, constrained monopoly
price, which in turn reduces the deadweight loss associated with the
monopoly. Two differences are to be noted. Unlike these models,
the present model assumes that the other side of the market consists
of homogeneous agents. Moreover, competition is beneficial even
to those agents that do not trade in equilibrium. In this sense, high
takeover premia protect minority shareholders.
B. Security-Voting Structure
Bidder i counters his rival’s offer as long as his profits are nonnega-
tive. Hence, for a security-voting structure s, bidder i is willing to
bid up to b si 5 {(1 2 φsi) 1 [di(φsi)/s]}vi per voting share.
Lemma 6. b si is decreasing in s .
The proof is given in section H of the Appendix. The result is due
to two effects. First, a higher concentration of votes increases the
winning bidder’s private gains, since it allows him to hold fewer re-
turn rights. Second, the bidder spreads these private gains across
fewer shares. The winner needs to outbid his opponent and to at-
tract at least half the votes. Hence, if b sj , b
s
i , bidder i wins the con-
test, and the equilibrium price is b 5 max[bsj, (1 2 φs/2i )vi]. The
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fiercer competition induced by a greater concentration of voting
rights has implications for the optimal design of corporate decision
rules.
Proposition 8. If there is effective competition under one share–
one vote, then deviating from one share–one vote intensifies compe-
tition, thereby increasing social surplus and security benefits.
The proof is given in section I of the Appendix. Both social surplus
and security benefits increase with the bid price when it results in
a larger final holding (proposition 1). Departing from one share–
one vote is optimal from both perspectives since it intensifies compe-
tition and thus raises bids. From a social perspective, this is true only
as long as the competitive price b s1 is less than the value of the minor-
ity shares if all voting shares are tendered, (1 2 φs2)v 2. Beyond this
threshold, a price increase does not translate into a larger holding of
bidder 2, since the bid is restricted to voting shares. Instead further
concentration of votes decreases his final holding. Provided that a
contest takes place, the socially optimal security-voting structure is
such that b s1 5 (1 2 φs2)v 2.
In contrast, higher takeover premia are valuable per se to share-
holders. Hence, they may be willing to decrease s further to extract
more of the winning bidder’s surplus even if it reduces social sur-
plus.18 It is interesting to note that shareholders deviate from the
socially optimal rule in the direction opposite to that in the single-
bidder case. In the latter case, maximizing takeover premia implies
a larger than socially optimal control majority that will prevent some
desirable takeovers. In the case of contests, higher premia are real-
ized by restricting the number of shares for which the bidders com-
pete. Consequently, shareholders may choose a smaller than socially
optimal control majority, which will lead to a lower ownership con-
centration and a more inefficient allocation of corporate resources.
Nonetheless, the present analysis suggests a rationale for a dual-class
share system from both the social and the shareholders’ viewpoint.
C. Freeze-out
In the absence of competition, the option to freeze out minority
shareholders constitutes a Pareto improvement. Bidding contests
make this option more attractive to the winning bidder and thus
more effective. Indeed, in a contested takeover, the winning bidder
acquires more than 50 percent of the shares. Hence, he incurs part
of the costs of attracting the threshold fraction f anyway. Increasing
the bid further in order to attract the fraction f is thus less costly
relative to the freeze-out gains.
18 The proof that a discrepancy is indeed possible is given in sec. I of the Appendix.
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D. Mandatory Bid Rule and (Un)conditional Offers
Proposition 6 shows that in the absence of competition, the MBR
has no effect irrespective of whether offers are conditional or not.
The picture is quite different in the case of competition.
Lemma 7. Under conditional offers, competing bidders make un-
restricted offers. If unconditional offers are allowed, they make of-
fers restricted to the control majority.
The proof is given in section J of the Appendix. Consider a bid-
ding contest with conditional offers. There are three equilibrium
outcomes: both offers fail, bidder 1 wins, or bidder 2 wins. Given
that shareholders coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium,
both bidders choose to make unrestricted offers, and the MBR has
no effect. Indeed, bidder 1’s most aggressive bid is to make an un-
restricted offer at a price v 1 since this maximizes firm value under
his control. Bidder 2 can match bidder 1’s offer by a higher bid b 2 .
v 1 restricted to ρ such that ρb 2 1 (1 2 ρ)(1 2 φρ2)v 2 5 v 1. Alterna-
tively, he can submit an unrestricted bid b 2 5 v 1, and a fraction β
of shares will be tendered such that (1 2 φβ¯2)v 2 5 v 1. Since his profit
is the difference between social surplus and v 1, he will choose the
offer that maximizes social surplus. Given that social surplus in-
creases with his final holding, bidder 2 will also choose an un-
restricted offer.
Consider now a bidding contest in which unconditional restricted
bids can be made. An unconditional bid with a higher price cannot
fail in equilibrium. Shareholders accepting this offer would not be
subject to rationing and would earn a higher return than by ac-
cepting the lower offer. Hence, given the choice of bid forms, the
losing bidder’s most aggressive offer is an unconditional bid re-
stricted to 50 percent of the shares. It enables him to raise his bid
the most by maximizing his potential private gains and spreading
them among fewer shares (lemma 6). The winning bidder’s best re-
sponse is also an unconditional offer restricted to 50 percent. Since
his only profits are private gains, he prefers to acquire as few shares
as possible. Hence, in equilibrium, the winner acquires only 50 per-
cent of the shares and sets φ i 5 φ50%i . It should be noted that with
restricted bids either bidder may win, although v 1 , v 2.
Proposition 9. The mandatory bid rule is irrelevant under condi-
tional offers. When unconditional offers are allowed, the MBR is
socially optimal but need not maximize security benefits.
The proof is given in section K of the Appendix. Under condi-
tional offers, the MBR is irrelevant since bidders make unrestricted
offers anyway. Under unconditional offers, the MBR ensures that a
high price due to competition leads to a larger fraction acquired by
192 journal of political economy
the winning bidder and hence to a more efficient use of resources.
Furthermore, imposing unrestricted bids also avoids the possibility
that bidder 1 wins the contest, although the resulting social surplus,
[(1 2 φ50%1 ) 1 d 1(φ50%1 )]v 1, falls short of the surplus that bidder 2
would have generated, [(1 2 φ50%2 ) 1 d 2(φ50%2 )]v 2.19
As regards the premium, the effect of restricted offers is similar
to that of dual-class shares. The more intense competition for 50
percent of the shares does not diminish the bidders’ potential pri-
vate gains but forces the winner to pay part of it out to the sharehold-
ers. The higher takeover premium can in some cases more than com-
pensate the shareholders for the lower minority share value
associated with partial bids. Hence, they might prefer no MBR and
unconditional offers.
Proposition 10. Social optimality requires either conditional of-
fers or unconditional offers with MBR, but shareholders may prefer
to allow restricted unconditional offers.
The proof is given in section K of the Appendix. The discrepancy
between the social optimum and the rule preferred by shareholders
stems again from the fact that the shareholders are after high take-
over premia, ignoring the bidder’s private costs and benefits. As
pointed out earlier, the effect of restricted offers is similar to that
of departing from the one share–one vote rule. In particular,
allowing for restricted unconditional offers intensifies the competi-
tion for the control majority and leads to higher bids. These higher
bids, however, do not translate into higher ex post ownership con-
centration and are thus purely neutral transfers from a social per-
spective.
VI. Value-Decreasing Bidders
For the sake of clarity, the model has deliberately abstracted from
several issues that influence optimal corporate decision rules. Most
important, it has been assumed that all potential bidders increase
security benefits, irrespective of the severity of the moral hazard
problem. This section relaxes this assumption and discusses infor-
mally the impact of various rules on the potential for value-decreas-
ing takeovers. Consider the case in which some bidders always de-
crease share value below its current value whereas other bidders may
19 Bidder 1’s winning implies
[d 1(φ50%1 ) 2 1/2φ50%1 ]v 1 2 [d 2(φ50%2 ) 2 1/2φ50%2 ]v 2 . 1/2(v 2 2 v 1).
This is the efficient outcome only if
1/2[d 1(φ50%1 ) 2 φ50%1 ]v 1 2 1/2[d 2(φ50%2 ) 2 φ50%2 ]v 2 . 1/2(v 2 2 v 1).
The first inequality, however, does not ensure that the second is also satisfied.
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or may not reduce security benefits, depending on the inefficiency
associated with the extraction of private benefits.
Consider the impact of an increase in the fraction of voting shares
in the absence of competition. The requirement to buy a larger stake
in order to gain control induces the bidder to internalize more of
the change in security benefits that he brings about. This has several
effects. First, a bidder who would decrease security benefits but enjoy
large private benefits might find it too costly to take over the firm
(deterrence effect). Second, when a bidder is not deterred, an increase
in the fraction of voting shares reduces the decrease in security bene-
fits he brings about (improvement effect). This reduction might possi-
bly be so large as to become a value improvement (redemption effect).
All these effects are positive in terms of social surplus and security
benefits. Similarly, in the absence of control contests, a supermajor-
ity rule increases the number of return rights required to gain con-
trol. Hence, the same three positive effects materialize as with an
increase in the fraction of voting shares.
The introduction of a freeze-out provision will be of little interest
to most value-decreasing bidders. A bidder who is going to lower
security benefits attempts to acquire control with as few return rights
as possible. Hence, he would not exercise the option to freeze out
minority shareholders, and thus this option is neutral. Yet, some bid-
ders who would have bid for 50 percent and decreased security bene-
fits may now find it more profitable to acquire 100 percent and thus
increase security benefits (redemption effect).
Finally, consider the impact of the MBR. Given that shareholders
coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, bids below the cur-
rent stock price fail. A bidder who is going to decrease security bene-
fits will make a loss on every share he acquires. Furthermore, antici-
pating the value decrease, all shareholders will tender. Hence, when
allowed, the bidder makes a bid restricted to 50 percent of the shares
and rations (prorates) tendering shareholders. By prohibiting ra-
tioning, the MBR forces the bidder to acquire a larger fraction of
shares and thus has the same three positive effects as a supermajority
rule. Moreover, the MBR prevents all takeovers in which sharehold-
ers realize a loss.
VII. Relation to the Literature
This section compares the present paper to some of the related liter-
ature, mainly Grossman and Hart (1980, 1988).20 In Grossman and
20 Harris and Raviv (1988) is very similar to Grossman and Hart (1988). For clarity,
the comparison is made with respect to the latter paper but applies to the former
as well.
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Hart (1980), the exogenous posttakeover value of the security bene-
fits determines the acquirer’s optimal bid price. In the present pa-
per, the security benefits are endogenous; that is, they are chosen
by the new controlling party. This endogeneity reverses the causality
between security benefits and bid price. To a given bid price corre-
sponds a unique equilibrium outcome in the tendering stage.
In Grossman and Hart (1980), an externality arises among share-
holders because control rights (i.e., votes) are attached to return
rights: by retaining their return rights, shareholders prevent an effi-
cient transfer of control. The present paper extends their analysis
by identifying another externality. The bidder does not get compen-
sated ex ante for abstaining from extracting private benefits ex post.
As a result, he acquires control with as few shares as necessary,
thereby maximizing the inefficiencies associated with the extraction
of private benefits. This further shortcoming of the takeover mecha-
nism arises irrespective of whether control rights are attached to re-
turn rights and whether control is at stake. For example, it also arises
when a majority shareholder is bidding for additional shares.
The two papers differ also in their implications for the case of
competition among bidders. Grossman and Hart argue that target
shareholders are unlikely to experience excessive expropriation by
granting the winning bidder the right to extract private benefits. In
the case of effective competition, the winning bid has to match the
rival’s bid and thus protects shareholders from excessive expropria-
tion. Note, however, that were a shareholder to decline the winning
offer, he would suffer the same expropriation as in the absence of
competition. In other words, competition protects shareholders only
ex ante. In the present paper’s framework, competition and the re-
sulting higher premia protect minority shareholders also ex post.
From a modeling perspective, the present model combines fea-
tures of the atomistic and the pivotal shareholder models of take-
overs. Like the latter (Bagnoli and Lipman 1988; Bebchuck 1989;
Holmstro¨m and Nalebuff 1992; Gromb 1993) but unlike the former,
the present model derives an equilibrium for a continuum of bid
prices in which shareholders are indifferent between tendering and
retaining their shares. In contrast to the pivotal shareholder model
but in accordance with the atomistic model, the shareholders are
assumed to be atomistic, and the returns from tendering and re-
taining are identical from an ex ante as well as an ex post perspective.
Corporate decision rules have commonly been evaluated in terms
of the trade-off between reducing the bidder’s rent and providing
sufficient incentives to undertake value-increasing takeovers. Gross-
man and Hart (1988) examine security-voting structures in this re-
spect. In their adverse selection framework, the level of security and
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private benefits implemented by a given bidder are exogenous, that
is, independent of his holding. In the case of a value-increasing bid-
der facing no competition, the security-voting structure is irrelevant.
It affects neither the security benefits nor the bidder’s profits. In the
case of a value-decreasing bidder whose substantial private benefits
make a takeover profitable, one share–one vote is optimal both from
a social and from the shareholders’ viewpoint. It maximizes the frac-
tion of return rights that the bidder has to acquire to obtain control
and thus forces him to internalize a larger share of the decrease in
security benefits that he would implement.
In the present paper, the design of voting rights matters also for
value-increasing single bidders. Concentrating votes enables the bid-
der to hold a smaller fraction of return rights. As a result, he extracts
more private benefits. Although this is ex post detrimental to social
surplus and shareholders’ interests, it may prove crucial for the oc-
currence of takeovers in the presence of substantial takeover costs.
Note that replacing the adverse selection framework by a moral
hazard model points at a potential conflict between the analyses of
Grossman and Hart (1980, 1988). In their earlier paper, Grossman
and Hart argue that in the case of substantial takeover costs, bidders
should be granted the right to dilute minority rights so that their
private benefits outweigh the takeover costs. In their later paper,
they promote the one share–one vote rule as an efficient deterrent
against value-decreasing bidders. In the present paper, departing
from one share–one vote and granting the right to extract private
benefits are equivalent.
In the case of competition, both Grossman and Hart (1988) and
the present paper find that departing from one share–one vote can
result in higher bid prices and thus maximize security benefits. How-
ever, in their model, one share–one vote is always socially optimal:
as the bidder always acquires all voting shares, more voting shares
imply that he has to acquire more return rights. The present paper
shows that the latter relation does not necessarily hold. Indeed, the
winning bidder no longer automatically acquires all voting shares.
Instead fewer voting shares translate into a higher bid price; as a
result, more voting shares are tendered.
Finally, the present paper’s analysis of freeze-out rules is closely
related to the analysis in Yarrow (1985), who shows that the CAL
can solve the free-rider problem. When an offer conditional on ac-
ceptance of the freeze-out fraction succeeds, any remaining minor-
ity shareholder will be forced to sell his shares on the terms of the
original offer. Hence, he may as well accept the original offer. In
Yarrow’s framework, a CAL’s beneficial effects are to allow takeovers
that would otherwise not be profitable. In the present paper, a CAL
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can improve in addition the efficiency and security benefits of take-
overs that would take place even in its absence.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
This paper reconsiders the tender offer mechanism given a dis-
persed ownership structure. When moral hazard problems are antic-
ipated to arise between minority shareholders and a new controlling
party, the bidder’s opportunity cost in a takeover increases with his
final holding. Indeed, moral hazard is alleviated by the size of the
bidder’s final holding. However, because of the free-rider behavior
of the target shareholders, the bidder is not compensated ex ante
for the reduced moral hazard problem ex post. Moreover, the equi-
librium supply of shares is shown to be increasing in the bid price.
As a result, the bidder acquires as few shares as necessary to gain
control, thereby maximizing the ex post moral hazard and the associ-
ated inefficiency.
State legislation and corporate charters are then examined in the
light of these shortcomings. By increasing the fraction of shares re-
quired to gain control, the one share–one vote rule reduces ex post
inefficiencies. However, it also reduces bidders’ surplus and thus
their incentives to launch takeovers. The presence of takeover costs
creates a trade-off between a higher likelihood of tender offers and
more efficient tender offers. It is interesting that by inducing higher
premia and maximizing ex post efficiency, the option to freeze out
minority shareholders constitutes a Pareto improvement. Competi-
tion (even by an inferior rival) also improves social welfare since it
leads to a higher bid price and, thus, more shares tendered and less
moral hazard. This effect can be further exploited by the security-
voting structure: fewer voting shares make competition fiercer and
hence lead to an even higher price and a larger supply of shares.
The mandatory bid rule has no effect under conditional offers but
is socially beneficial under unconditional offers. Finally, the paper
also shows that socially optimal rules are unlikely to emerge through
private contracting. Target shareholders’ endeavor to extract high
takeover premia either prevents some socially efficient takeovers or
exacerbates the underconcentration of ownership.
The present model has abstracted from a number of issues. In
particular, the impact of various rules on the potential for manage-
ment entrenchment has not been considered. In addition, there
may be instances in which a larger shareholding does not lead to an
increase in security benefits (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997).
Another caveat is the assumption that the ownership structure re-
mains stable once the offer is completed. If the bidder had the op-
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portunity and incentive to retrade ex post, the takeover outcome
would be affected. For instance, when the bidder increases his stake
after the takeover, the share value increases, which in turn reduces
the shareholders’ incentive to sell in the tender offer. While a com-
plete analysis of the bidder’s incentive and ability to retrade is be-
yond the scope of the present paper, its main result provides a simple
insight. Provided that trading is not anonymous, the purchase of an
additional ∆ shares after the takeover is not profitable for the bidder.
This holds irrespective of whether the shareholders anticipate this
further acquisition at the tender offer stage or not. In the former
case, shareholders free-ride on the entire value improvement im-
plied by the bidder’s increased final holding. Consequently, the bid-
der has to pay for all shares the same price, equal to the postretrad-
ing share value (1 2 φβ1∆)v . By proposition 1, this cannot be an
optimal strategy since it is equivalent to acquiring more shares than
the control majority in the tender offer. In the case in which share-
holders fail to anticipate subsequent retrading, the tender price re-
mains unchanged, (1 2 φβ)v, and the bidder has to pay the post-
retrading share value (1 2 φβ1∆)v only for the ∆ shares acquired
subsequently on the open market. Even when shareholders are
somewhat myopic, this additional acquisition is not profitable. First,
the bidder does not make a profit on these ∆ shares. Second, the
reduction in private benefits due to the larger final holding exceeds
the value increase of those shares acquired in the tender offer.21 Of
course, trades need not be public and traders may be excessively
myopic, in which case the analysis should be amended.
Because of these various limitations, the analysis is biased, and it
would thus be inappropriate to draw definite conclusions, let alone
policy recommendations. Nevertheless, some important insights
emerge that contrast with most of the received literature. The diver-
gence is to a large extent due to one feature of the moral hazard
framework: a larger final stake held by the bidder increases social
surplus and shareholders’ return but decreases his profits.
Several avenues are left for future research. First, as already men-
tioned, crucial to the analysis is the bidder’s assumed inability to
commit ex ante to a given level of private benefit extraction ex post.
It may thus be interesting to explore the existence and impact of
21 Buying ∆ shares will not be profitable for the bidder if
(β 1 ∆)(1 2 φβ1∆)v 1 d(φβ1∆)v 2 ∆(1 2 φβ1∆)v , β(1 2 φβ)v 1d(φβ)v .
This inequality can be written as
β(1 2 φβ1∆)v 1 d(φβ1∆)v , β(1 2 φβ)v 1d(φβ)v,
which is satisfied by revealed preferences.
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commitment technologies. One example might involve the mode of
financing takeovers. It has been implicitly assumed that the bidder
pays the acquired shares out of his own pocket. However, takeovers
are typically highly leveraged, and creditors are protected by senior-
ity. In the present paper’s framework, this implies that for any given
final stake, the fraction of the cash flow that the bidder can claim
is decreasing in the debt level. This reduces the incentive effect of
large shareholdings so that the extent of inefficient extraction of
private gains by the bidder increases with leverage. This in turn shifts
the share supply curve to the right, and the equilibrium bid price
is reduced. Thus debt financing allows the bidder to extract more
private benefits. Second, the analysis can shed some light on the
trading of block holdings. Indeed, the transfer of a minority control-
ling block should be seen as an alternative to other means of trans-
ferring control, such as a tender offer. A tender offer generates posi-
tive externalities for small shareholders in the form of takeover
premia and improved security benefits. By acquiring the block in-
stead, the bidder can bypass small shareholders and share the exter-
nality with the incumbent block holder. The block is thus traded at
a premium with respect to the price of dispersed shares before and
after the control transfer. It may thus be possible to relate the occur-
rence and the observed patterns of block trading to the level and
characteristics of the takeover activity (Burkart et al. 1996).
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The first and second derivatives of the bidder’s profit with respect to φ are
2β 1 d ′(φ) and d ″(φ). The problem is concave as d ″(φ) , 0. The derivatives
d ′(0) 5 1 and d ′(1) 5 0 ensure an interior solution for all β $ 1/2. Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
When deciding to tender, shareholders compare b with (1 2 φβˆ)v . If b ,
(1 2 φ50%)v, then b , (1 2 φβˆ)v for all βˆ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence, no shares are
tendered. If b . v, then b . (1 2 φβˆ)v for all βˆ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence, all shares
are tendered; that is, α 5 1 2 ω. If b ∈ [(1 2 φ50%)v, v], then by lemma
1 there exists βˆ ∈ [1/2, 1] such that b 5 (1 2 φβˆ)v . Anticipating this βˆ, all
shareholders are indifferent between tendering and retaining their shares.
In addition, for all b $ (1 2 φ50%)v, any α , 1/2 2 ω is an equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, anticipating failure, each shareholder is indifferent be-
tween tendering and retaining. However, this outcome is Pareto-dominated
by the outcome in which the bid succeeds, that is, β $ 1/2. Q.E.D.
Three comments about the equilibrium in lemma 2 should be made.
i) Equilibrium strategies.—The outcome with b ∈ [(1 2 φ50%)v, v] may be
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seen as originating from different types of equilibria. For instance, a mass
α of shareholders may tender their shares whereas others retain theirs.
However, this solution requires a rather unlikely degree of coordination
among dispersed shareholders. Alternatively, each shareholder may tender
a fraction α of his shares and retain the rest. This equilibrium requires
no coordination but assumes that shareholdings can be (infinitely) split.
Instead, each shareholder may tender all his shares with probability α and
retain them with probability 1 2 α. Provided that the law of large numbers
holds, a fraction α of all shares is tendered. ( Judd [1985] shows that a
continuum of independent random variables may generate a stochastic out-
come; i.e., the law of large numbers may fail to hold.) There are also semi-
mixed-strategy equilibria, where some shareholders randomize but others
play pure strategies.
ii) Unconditional bids.—Allowing for unconditional bids does not alter the
basic results. For unconditional bids b $ (1 2 φ50%)v, proposition 1 is valid.
Moreover, Pareto-dominated equilibrium outcomes disappear. An uncon-
ditional bid b $ (1 2 φ50%)v cannot fail, since tendering is optimal whenever
the bid is anticipated to fail. While unconditional bids yield clear-cut results
for b $ (1 2 φ50%)v, the outcome for b , (1 2 φ50%)v is not well defined.
There is no equilibrium in which the outcome is deterministic. Hence, if
an equilibrium exists, the takeover must succeed with probability strictly
between zero and one, contradicting the law of large numbers (Bagnoli
and Lipman 1988).
iii) Selection criterion and stability.—Two Nash equilibrium outcomes have
been identified, and one has been selected out by the Pareto-dominance
criterion. Applying other refinement concepts is intricate since sharehold-
ers are atomistic. It can be shown that, with nonatomistic shareholders,
equilibria in which the bid fails with probability one are not perfect equilib-
ria (see Gromb 1993).
C. Proof of Lemma 3




5 ω 2 d ′1v 2 bv 2 5 ω 2 β , 0
as ω , 1/2 # β. The bidder’s individual rationality constraint requires Π(b)
5 [ω(1 2 φ50%) 1 d(φ50%)]v 2 c $ 0. Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
For a given decision rule (κ, s), let X(κs) be the set of characteristics x 5
(c x, ωx, vx, d x) such that a bidder will actually make a tender offer. By propo-
sition 1, the bidder will acquire as few shares as necessary (i.e., κs) so that
x is in X iff [ωx(1 2 φκsx ) 1 d x(φκsx )]vx 2 c x $ 0.
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As κs increases, the takeover probability decreases; that is, the measure
of X(κs) decreases.
The conditional expected premium is
#
X(κs)





which need not be increasing in κs . To see this, consider the following
example. The bidder can be equiprobably one of two types, 1 or 2, which
differ only in that d 1(φ) 5 φ 2 (φK/K) and d 2(φ) 5 φ 2 (φ2/2), where K
. 2 is an integer, whereas v 1 5 v 2 5 v, ω1 5 ω2 5 0, and c 1 5 c 2. In other
words, the only uncertainty pertains to the level of inefficiency of private
benefit extraction, type 1 being able to extract private benefits more effi-
ciently than type 2. At stage 3, each type i chooses φ such that κs 5
d ′i (φκsi ). Given d 1(⋅) and d 2(⋅), there exists a level κs such that type 2 just
breaks even, and type 1’s private benefits are still strictly positive. Actually,
K can be chosen arbitrarily large, and so φ κs1 is arbitrarily close to one; that
is, type 1’s bid premium is arbitrarily close to zero. At κs, the conditional
expected premium is then arbitrarily close to 1/2(1 2 φκs2 )v . 0. As a result
of an increase slightly beyond κs, type 2 does not make an offer and type
1’s bid is still arbitrarily close to zero. Hence, for large values of K, the
conditional expected takeover premium drops from 1/2(1 2 φκs2 )v to zero,
when the control majority is increased marginally above κs . Note that in
this example, for K large enough, the one share–one vote rule is strictly
dominated. Q.E.D.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Expected security benefits are
V(κs) 5 #
X(κs)
(1 2 φκsx )vx g(x)dx,
where g(⋅) is the distribution of characteristics. Expected social surplus is
W(κs) 5 #
X(κs)
[(1 2 φκsx )vx 1 d x(φκsx )vx 2 c x]g(x)dx .
As κs increases, X(κs) ‘‘shrinks’’ and d x(φκsx )vx 2 c x decreases, so that
W(κs) 2 V(κs) 5 #
X(κs)
[d x(φκsx )vx 2 c x]g(x)dx
decreases. Hence, W is maximized for a lower value of κs than V. Q.E.D.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
First note that no freeze-out rule is equivalent to f 5 1. For each value of
f, each potential bidder has three options: (1) bid (1 2 φκsx )vx to attract the
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control majority κs, (2) bid (1 2 φ fx)vx to attract a fraction f and freeze out
the rest, or (3) not bid.
Following a decrease in f, (a) some bidders switch from option 3 to op-
tion 2, (b) some bidders switch from option 1 to option 2, and (c) bidders
stick to option 2. Effect a obviously increases social surplus and security
benefits. Effect b increases social surplus since it results in a more concen-
trated ownership and increases security benefits since a higher bid price is
needed to attract more shares. Effect c is neutral from a social viewpoint
since the final ownership concentration is unchanged. Hence social surplus
is decreasing in f, so that it increases when any freeze-out rule is introduced,
and it is maximized for f 5 κs . However, effect c decreases security benefits
since it results in a lower bid price. When there is no freeze-out rule, there
is no such effect. Hence security benefits increase when a freeze-out rule
is introduced but, in general, are not maximized under f 5 κs . Q.E.D.
G. Proof of Proposition 7
Each bidder is willing to bid up to bi 5 vi . Hence, bidder 2 wins with b 2 5
max[b1, (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2] since he has to outbid bidder 1 and attract at least
50 percent. If v 1 # (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, the constraint imposed by competition is
not binding. Otherwise there is active competition and b 2 5 v 1. Then propo-
sition 1 applies. Q.E.D.
H. Proof of Lemma 6
Since φ si is strictly decreasing in s, ∂bi/∂s has the opposite sign of
∂bsi/∂φsi . Substituting d ′i (φsi) for s in bsi and differentiating yields ∂bsi/∂φsi 5
2d i(φ i)d ″i (φi)/[d ′i (φ i)]2 . 0. Q.E.D.
I. Proof of Proposition 8
Effective competition under s 5 1 implies that bidder 2 wins at a price b
5 v 1. Denote by φβ¯2 the allocation that satisfies (1 2 φβ¯2)v 2 5 v 1. Given that
v 2 . v 1 . (1 2 φ 50%2 )v 2, that (1 2 φs2)v 2 increases with s, and that b s1 de-
creases with s, there exists sˆ , 1 such that b sˆ1 5 (1 2 φ sˆ2)v 2. Denote by
φβs2 the allocation that satisfies bs1 5 (1 2 φβs2 )v 2. Since bs1 decreases with s,βs . β and φβs2 , φβ¯2 for all s ∈ [sˆ, 1). Hence, social surplus is increasing as
s decreases in this range. For s , sˆ, b s1 . (1 2 φβs2 )v 2 and the final holding
is determined by s . Hence, in the range [0, sˆ], social surplus is increasing
in s . Q.E.D.
Let s* and s** denote the social and private optima. The possibility that
s** can strictly exceed s* is proved by an example. For v 1 5 1, d 1(φ) 5 φ
2 1/2φ2, v 2 5 2, and d 2(φ) 5 (1 1 φ)ln(1 1 φ) 2 1/2φ2(1 1 ln 2), s* 5
0.618492 and dV/ds | s5s* 5 20.85326.
J. Proof of Lemma 7
Consider effective competition, that is, v 1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, with conditional
offers and no MBR. Assume that shareholders coordinate on the Pareto-
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dominating equilibrium. Bidder k makes an offer at a price bk restricted to
a fraction ρk of the shares, k 5 1, 2. Call the loser j and the winner i . Bidder
j ’s most aggressive offer is to maximize shareholder surplus Vj under his
control. Bidder i ’s best response is to maximize Π i subject to the constraint
that he offers the shareholders at least Vj. Bidder j ’s and i ’s programs are
max Vj subject to Π j $ 0 and max Π i subject to Vi $ Vj. Both constraints
are binding (proposition 1). Hence, the solution to j ’s problem is bj 5 vj,
and ρj 5 1; that is, j ’s offer is unrestricted.
The winner’s problem can be rewritten as max Wi subject to Vi 5 Vj,
where Wi is the social surplus under bidder i ’s control. Social surplus Wi
is strictly increasing in bidder i ’s final holdings, that is, in ρi as long as
(1 2 φρii )vi , bi, and is independent of bj. Shareholder surplus Vi is a func-
tion of both bi and ρ i. Hence, at the optimum, bi 5 (1 2 φρii )vi; that is, there
is no rationing of shareholders, which is equivalent to the offer’s being
unrestricted. Since by assumption v 1 , v 2, j 5 1 and i 5 2.
Consider effective competition, that is, v 1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, with uncondi-
tional bids and no MBR. With unconditional bids, the higher bid cannot
fail in equilibrium. As 50 percent 5 argmax b ρj subject to β $ 50 percent
(lemma 6), the losing bidder j ’s most aggressive offer is a bid restricted to
50 percent of the shares. The winning bidder i submits a bid at the same
price. His surplus is ρ i(1 2 φρii )(vi 2 bj) 1 d i(φρii )vi . Since φi is strictly de-
creasing in ρi, ∂Π i/∂ρ i has the opposite sign of ∂Π i/∂φi. Substituting
d ′(φρii ) for ρ i and differentiating yields ∂Π i/∂φi 5 d ″(φi)[(1 2 φ i)vi 2 bj]
. 0. Hence, bidder i ’s surplus is decreasing in ρ i, and ρ*i 5 50 percent.
Q.E.D.
K. Proof of Propositions 9 and 10
Clearly, the MBR is irrelevant under conditional bids because bidders use
unrestricted bids anyway.
Consider the case in which unconditional and restricted bids are allowed.
If
[(1 2 φ50%1 ) 1 2d 1(φ50%1 )]v 1 . [(1 2 φ50%2 ) 1 2d 2(φ50%2 )]v 2, j 5 2, i 5 1,
then φ 5 φ50%1 and W 5 [(1 2 φ50%1 ) 1 d 1(φ50%1 )]v1 , v 1. If
[(1 2 φ50%2 ) 1 2d 2(φ50%2 )]v 2 . [(1 2 φ50%1 ) 1 2d 1(φ50%1 )]v 1, j 5 1, i 5 2,
then φ 5 φ50%2 and W 5 [(1 2 φ50%2 ) 1 d 2(φ50%2 )]v 2.
Under MBR, proposition 7 applies, and bidder 2 always wins. Denote
by φβ¯2 the allocation that satisfies (1 2 φβ¯2)v 2 5 v 1. For v 1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, φ 5
φβ¯2 and W 5 [(1 2 φβ¯2) 1 d 2(φβ¯2)]v 2, which is larger than both [(1 2
φ50%1 ) 1 d 1(φ50%1 )]v 1 and [(1 2 φ50%2 ) 1 d 2(φ50%2 )]v 2.
Under the MBR, security benefits are v 1. Without MBR, bidder i bids up
to [(1 2 φ50%i ) 1 2d i(φ50%i )]v i. If b50%2 . b50%1 . (1 2 φ50%2 )v 2, bidder 2 wins
by bidding b50%1 . Shareholders realize a return equal to 1/2b50%1 1 1/2(1 2
φ50%2 )v 2, which is larger than v 1 if b50%1 2 v 1 . (φ50%2 2 φβ¯2)v 2.
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